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Professor Duran rightly laments the privileging of traditional logic over emotions in 
Western culture. The Platonic argument he presents, that emotions are irrational because 
they cannot be “connected to the sequences that are characteristic of logical reasoning” 
and therefore should be “controlled and hopefully repressed” (p. 3), exists explicitly and 
implicitly in much of our public discourse and certainly in our academic systems.  
His goal is to reposition emotions as a valuable aspect of human interactions and a 
necessary component for establishing social order. To do so he must first free emotion 
from the label of “irrational.” Since “rational” is equated with “logical” he turns to Matte-
Blanco’s theory of Bi-Logic that explains emotions as a kind of logic. According to Bi-
Logic, our thinking consists of both traditional logic and symmetrical logic. Emotions 
follow the latter, working by complete identification of the elements under consideration. 
And while the PS is a different kind of logic, it still “assumes traditional logic as 
operating all the time” (p. 6). Professor Duran then relates Bi-Logic to Michael Gilbert’s 
theory of Multi-Modal Argumentation that argues for the legitimacy and importance of 
emotional arguments in any consideration of human disputation. In these two theories 
Professor Duran finds thought and emotion intimately related, rather than opposed, 
thereby helping to remove the label of “irrational” from emotion. 
Despite this progress, Professor Duran is not completely satisfied with Bi-Logic 
or Gilbert’s theory of emotional argument since both continue to rely on traditional logic, 
either mathematical-logical concepts or structures of premises and conclusions. The very 
solution to rescuing emotions from the realm of irrationality, by understanding emotional 
thinking as a kind of logic, presents its own difficulty. Professor Duran pushes further, 
asking, as he concludes his paper, how can we “deal with emotions from the perspective 
of emotions?” (p. 11), implying that true redemption of emotion would only come when 
it is recognized as valuable in its own terms. Defining what that would mean is a daunting 
task; as he points out, the work on emotions is vast, but we can further the discussion by 
considering other efforts to reconcile emotions and reasoning. First, however, I would 
like to consider in more detail what the theory of Bi-Logic does or does not provide to 
our understanding of emotions.  
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To apply the PS to emotions is to address the thought process that is the source of 
the emotion. As Duran explains in the example of Paula, her desire is strong because she 
identifies her entire life with being a doctor. The theory rightly ties the emotion, desire, to 
a thought process. The PS emphasizes, “the thinking that appears in emotion is an 
inherent part of it” (p. 7).  This may be stating the obvious, but, as he also pointed out, in 
Western culture, emotions have been radically separated from thought, each commonly 
defined in opposition to the other. Thus, to point out that emotions come from some 
connection of ideas is important. 
 However, it seems to me that the PS in Bi-Logic fails to capture the richness and 
nuances of our emotional operations. For example, as I understand it, the PS assumes but 
does account for the presence of values in emotional thinking. Paula’s emotional desire 
can only be explained by her valuing being a doctor as a good because it equates with her 
life, also a good. In contrast, what if Paula is being pressured to become a doctor by her 
parents but she is vehemently opposed? In an argument with them, she might state, “My 
life will be over if I become a doctor.” Thus, we might see the PS here, but it produces 
despair or anger, rather than desire. Perhaps Matte-Blanco treats the production of 
specific emotions in other areas of his work, but I think an explanation of emotional 
thinking should address the related value judgment, which the PS alone does not. 
Also, to claim that all emotional thinking operates by identification seems too 
limiting in other ways. Consider if Paula’s reason for desiring the A was that without an 
A she would lose her scholarship and have to stop her education? In this case she is not 
identifying her life with her education, but rather citing a good she values and a possible 
cause for her losing it. We could find many examples in which emotions do not result 
from parts being identified with the whole (PS). And although Duran acknowledges there 
can be many levels of symmetrical depth, it is not clear to me how something can be 
symmetrical by degree. Things are either identical or not. Once there is some difference, 
they are no longer identical.  
 In light of these misgivings regarding Bi-Logic and of Duran’s wish to explore 
emotions from the perspective of emotions, I would like to look briefly at how emotions 
are dealt with in rhetorical theory and coherence theory.  
 For rhetoricians, emotions have always been an important and necessary aspect of 
effective argument, working in concert with logic. Although there is much written on 
pathos, I will just give a very basic explanation using Aristotle. He presents emotions as 
an important tool in persuasion in so far as the speaker can put her audience into the right 
frame of mind, so as to be predisposed to agree with the argument. In Book I he states,  
 
[There is persuasion] through the hearers when they are led to feel emotion [pathos] by the speech; 
for we do not give the same judgment when grieved and rejoicing or when being friendly and 
hostile” (1.2.5).  
 
This fact, that emotions do affect our judgment, is precisely why emotions have been 
condemned, seen as interfering with logic. But Aristotle presents emotions in the service 
of reason, rather than its enemy. He also discusses emotions as influencing the argument 
through ethos—are the speaker’s emotions appropriate, showing similar judgment and 
values as the audience?  
In explaining how to use emotions for rhetorical effectiveness, Aristotle first 
defines emotions as, “those things through which, by undergoing change, people come to 
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differ in their judgments and which are accompanied by pain and pleasure” (2.1.8). For 
example, he defines pity as  
 
a certain pain at an apparently destructive or painful evil happening to one who does not deserve it 
and which a person might expect himself or one of his own to suffer” (2.8.2). 
 
So we feel pity for those prudent and hardworking people who have recently lost their 
financial savings, through no fault of their own, but because of the downturn in the 
economy. In this case we judge the event as bad and undeserved and that judgment 
evokes an unpleasant feeling Aristotle simply describes as “pain.” 
 We find similar descriptions of the emotional process in contemporary coherence 
theories that posit we evaluate new information in light of how it fits or does not fit with 
what we already know and accept. Coherence is central to explanations of narrative 
rationality that claim we think in terms of narratives (stories) that include not simply 
sequences and causes of events, but human motivations, values, beliefs, etc. In narrative 
rationality, coherence is much broader than logical validity, as it includes a range of 
human factors. (Fisher 1989) 
 But more closely related to the field of argumentation are coherence theories of 
inference and decision-making. Paul Thagard, describes decisions as based on epistemic 
as well as emotional coherence. He explains coherence generally as, 
 
When we make sense of a text, picture, person, or event, we need to construct an interpretation 
that fits with the available information better than alternative interpretations. The best 
interpretation is one that provides the most coherent account of what we want to understand, 
considering both pieces of information that fit with each other and pieces of information that do 
not fit with each other. (Thagard 2001, p. 360) 
 
The fitting together or cohering can take place in a variety of ways, through “explanation, 
deduction, facilitation, association,” etc. And each element within a system has an 
emotional “valence,” either a positive or negative attitude associated with it. He uses the 
example of “dentist” as having a negative valence for many people. (He acknowledges 
that positive and negative valences do not fully account for complex emotions; rather he 
provides general descriptions of how more complex attitudes operate.) The valence of 
elements comes from the valences of all the other elements to which it is connected. The 
negative valence of dentist comes from its association with pain. For Paula, the positive 
value of the A comes from its relation to another positive element, medical school, which 
is connected with being a doctor, the apparent purpose of her life. Thagard’s theory of 
epistemic and emotional coherence allows for a variety of relationships among elements, 
thus freeing us from the confines of traditional logic, and it accounts for the feelings 
those relationships evoke.  
 This cursory look at how coherence theory and rhetorical theory treat emotions 
suggests some ways to account for emotions that recognize their connection to reasoning, 
as Bi-Logic does, but also for the value judgments corresponding to that reasoning. 
Whether we can consider either of these theories as treating emotions from the 
perspective of emotions remains an open question.   
 
          Link to paper 
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